The Two Fundamental Problems Of The Theory Of Knowledge

Description

In a letter of 1932, Karl Popper described Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie – The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge– as ‘…a child of crises, above all of …the crisis of physics.’

Finally available in English, it is a major contribution to the philosophy of science, epistemology and twentieth century philosophy generally.
The two fundamental problems of knowledge that lie at the centre of the book are the problem of induction, that although we are able to observe only a limited number of particular events, science nevertheless advances unrestricted universal statements; and the problem of demarcation, which asks for a separating line between empirical science and non-science.

Popper seeks to solve these two basic problems with his celebrated theory of falsifiability, arguing that the inferences made in science are not inductive but deductive; science does not start with observations and proceed to generalise them but with problems, which it attacks with bold conjectures.

The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledgeis essential reading for anyone interested in Karl Popper, in the history and philosophy of science, and in the methods and theories of science itself.

Author description

Karl Popper (1902-94). Philosopher, born in Vienna. One of the most influential and controversial thinkers of the twentieth century.

Table of contents

Preface 1978 Introduction 1978 Exposition [1933] Book I: The Problem of Induction (Experience and Hypothesis) The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge Volume I Chapter 1: Formulation of the Problem Chapter 2: Deductivism and Inductivism Chapter 3: The Problem of Induction Chapter 4: The Normal-Statement Positions Chapter 5: Kant and Fries Chapter 6: The Probability Positions Chapter 7: The Pseudo-Statement Positions Chapter 8: Conventionalism Chapter 9: Strictly Universal Statements and Singular Statements Chapter 10: Back to the Pseudo-Statement Positions Chapter 11: Pseudo-Statement Positions and the Concept of Meaning Chapter 12: Conclusion Appendix: The Critique of the Problem of Induction in Schematic Representation Book II: The Problem of Demarcation (Experience and Metaphysics) The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge Volume II (Fragments) Part One: Fragments 1932 Sketch of an Introduction [I.]Formulation of the Problem [II.] On the Question of Eliminating Subjectivist Psychologism [III.] Transition to the Theory of Method [IV.]The Method of Exhaustion. -- "State of Affairs" and "Fact". -- Universal Diversity [V.] Sketch of a Theory of Empirical-Scientific Methods (Theory of Experience) Part Two: Fragments 1933 Orientation [VI.] Philosophy [VII.] The Problem of Methodology [VIII.] Comments on the So-Called Problem of Free Will [IX.] The Problem of Free Will [X.] The Problem of the Randomness in Probability Statements Appendix Summary Excerpt (1932) from The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge Editor's Postscript Index of Names Index of Subjects